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COMMENTS
Racial Segregation in the Public Schools
On May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court of the United States, with Mr. Chief
Justice Warren speaking for a unanimous Court, rendered the most controversial
and far-reaching decision of the Twentieth Century in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.1 The decision was hailed as a monumental constructive stride in constitu-
tional law and fundamental justice.2 It was simultaneously severely condemned as
a blow to fundamental American institutions.
3
Petitioners, in four separate cases considered by the Court prior to its
decision, were Negro children who were denied admission to their neighborhood
schools because of their race. Although the facts and local conditions varied, the
same fundamental question was: "Does segregation of children in public schools
solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other tangible
factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educa-
tional opportunities?" 4  The arguments in the state courts, and later in the
Supreme Court itself, concentrated on the validity of the "separate but equal"
doctrine as applied to public education. On the basis of the common legal ques-
tion, the Court delivered a consolidated opinion on the four cases presented-
from Kansas,5 South Carolina,6 Virginia,' and from Delaware.8 The Kansas, South
1347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2N.Y. Times, May 18, 1954, pp. 1, 18.
aWash. Even. Star, May 17, 1954, p. 1.4 Note 1, supra at 493.
5 The Brown case was an action by Oliver Brown, et al., against the Board of Education
of Topeka, Kansas, for a judgement declaring unconstitutional a state statute authorizing
on a permissive basis, but not requiring, segregated education in cities of 15,000 or more
population. Kan. Gen. Stat. § 72-1724 (1949). The Federal District Court, although
recognizing the detrimental effects of segregation in public schools on the Negro children,
held that such a segregated school system for the first six elementary grades did not violate
the constitutional guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. The school systems were
substantially equal in all respects. Brown v. Board of Education, 98 F. Supp. 797 (5th Cir.
1951).
6 Injunctive relief was asked by Negro children of both grade and high school age
to enjoin enforcement of South Carolina statutes requiring separate school systems for the
white and colored races. S.C. Const., Art. XI. § 5377 (1942). The three judge Federal District
Court refused to enjoin the Board of Trustees of Clarendon County, admitted the in-
equality of the schools, recognized the relationship of state legislation to education, but
granted the school authorities "reasonable time" to improve the Negro schools. The Board
was directed to report back to the court in six months on the equalization program. 98 F.
Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951). On remand from the United States Supreme Court it was
found that substantial equality in the schools had been achieved. Briggs v. Elliott, 103 F.
Supp. 920 (E.D.S.C. 1952).
7 The plaintiffs were Negro children of high school age residing in Prince Edward
County, Virginia. Recourse was taken to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia to enjoin enforcement of the state constitution and code which required segre-
gation in the public school system. Va. Const. §140; Va. Code, § 22-221 (1950). The three
judge District Court denied relief, and, as in the South Carolina case, found unequal
facilities in the Negro schools, but directed the school authorities to equalize the schools
with "reasonable diligence." Davis v. County School Board, 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va.
1952).
8 This was an action by Ethel Belton, and other children, against authorities in New
Carolina, and Virginia cases were before the Court on direct appeal." The Dela-
ware case came to the Supreme Court on a Writ of Certiorari.10
The Court held that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate
but equal" has no place."' Thus, the formidable doctrine established in Plessy v.
Ferguson,'2 was finally abolished in education. On the same day, with analogous
facts and conditions, a subsequent decision was given with regard to the constitu-
tionality of racial segregation in the District of Columbia public schools.' 8 The
issue in the Boiling case was whether racial segregation in the public schools of the
nation's capital deprived the petitioners of "due process of law" under the Fifth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution.' 4 The Court held that although the Fifth
Amendment does not possess an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth,
nevertheless, the two Amendments are not mutually exclusive. 5 In its considera-
tion of discrimination, the Court stated that it may be so "unjustifiable as to be
violative of due process."11 Since segregation in public education did not serve
any proper governmental objective, it imposed "on Negro children an arbitrary
deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause" of the Fifth
Amendment.'
7
The immediate effect of the Brown decision was to declare unconstitutional,
statutory provisions requiring segregated public schools in seventeen states."8 It
Castle County, Delaware, to enjoin the state constitutional and code provisions requiring
segregation in the public schools. Del. Const. Art. X, § 2; Del. Rev. Code § 2631 (1935).
On the basis of obvious inequality the Chancery Court gave judgement requiring admission
of the Negro children to schools previously attended only by white children. The Supreme
Court of Delaware affirmed the Chancellor's decree. 91 A.2d 137 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1952).
The defendants applied to the Supreme Court of the United States on the basis of error
by the Delaware courts in admitting the Negro children to previously white schools.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Gebhart v. Belton, 344 U.S. 891 (1952).
9 28 U.S.C. § 1253. Each case was a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
10344 U.S. 891 (1952). No. 448.
11 Note 1, supra at 495.
12 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, considered the law "color-
blind" and that the Court should not recognize the "separate but equal" legal basis. The
Supreme Court in the Segregation Cases restricted itself to education alone and did not
discuss transportation or public recreational facilities. See notes 123, 124, 125, 126, infra.
13 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
14 The Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution reads in part: "No person shall
be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
",Note 13, supra at 499.
10 Id. at 499.
1' Id. at 500.
18 Ala. Const., Art. XIV, § 256 (1901); Code, Title § 93 (1940); Ark. Stats. Ann.
§ 80-509 (1947); Del. Const. Art. X § 2; Rev. Code, Ch. 71, § 9; Fla. Const., Art. XII,
§ 12; Stats. § 228.09 (1951); Ga. Const., Art. VIII, § 1 (1945); Code Ann.
§ 32-909 (Cum. Supp. 1951); Ky. Const., § 187; Rev. Stats. Ann. § 158.020 (1943); La.
Const., Art. XII § 1 (1921); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 77 § 111,192; Miss. Const., Art. 8, §
207, Code Ann., § 6276 (Cum. Supp. 1950); Mo. Const. Art. IX, § l(a) (1945); Rev.
Stats. § 163.130 (1949); N.C. Const., Art. IX, § 2 (1868); Gen. Stats., § 115 (1952);
Okla. Const., Art. XIII, § 3 (1907); Sess. Laws, Tit. 70, Art. 5, § 1 (1949); S.C. Const.,
Art. XI, § 7 (1895); Code, § 5377 (1942); Tenn. Const. Art. XI, § 7 (1870); Code Ann.
§ 2377 (Williams 1934); Texas Const., Art. VII, § 7; Civ. Stats. Ann., Art. 2719 (Vernon
1951); Va. Const., Art. IX, § 140 (1902); Code, § 22-221 (1950); W. Va. Const., Art.
XII, § 8; Code Ann. § 1775 (1949).
also invalidated statutes in four states permitting the maintenance of segregated
schools on an optional basis.19
The legal history behind the evolution of the "separate but equal" doctrine into
its acceptance, use, and final overthrow in education, is a history of inter-racial
relations, public school education, and constitutional law in the United States for
almost one hundred years. The gravity of the situation is epitomized by Judge
Prettyman in Carr v. Corning:
20
Since the beginning of human history, no circumstances has given rise to
more difficult and delicate problems than has the coexistence of different races
in the same area.
Pre-Civil War
Prior to the Civil War the education of the Negro in the South was almost nil.
In fact, during this period most Southern States enacted legislation prohibiting the
education of free and slave Negroes on the basis that such education was conducive
to rebelliousness. 21 Approximately ninety-five per cent of the colored population
of the South was illiterate at the time of the Civil War.2  But, the educational




In the Northern states, nevertheless, the Abolitionists were active in the
educational and civil rights field. They were interested in full civil equality for
the Negroes. Under Abolitionist pressure, the Massachusetts Legislature enacted a
statute assuring the Negro people a right to public education by providing an
action for damages to any such person "unlawfully excluded" from the public
schools. 4 The foundation for their concept was substantially that laid down in the
Declaration of Independence 25 and in the Massachusetts Constitution.26
In Boston, the City sought to establish separate schools for Negroes. The
Abolitionists considered this an evasive act to avoid the spirit and letter of the
Bill of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution. A suit was brought by them on
behalf of a Negro girl required to attend a separate school. Thus, the now famous
Roberts v. City of Boston27 case was in litigation.
19Ariz. Code Ann., § 54-416 (Cum. Supp. 1951); Kan. Gen. Stats. Ann., § 72-1724
(1949); N. Mex. Stats. Ann., § 55-1201 (1941); Wyo. Comp. Stats. Ann., § 67-624
(1945).
20 182 F. 2d 14, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
21 NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM, 70-71 (1949). For a review of these laws see the
speech of Senator Wilson of Massachusetts on April 12, 1860. Cong. Globe, 36th Cong.
1st Sess. 1685 (1860).2 2
BOND, THE EDUCATION OF THE NEGRO IN THE AMERICAN SOCIAL ORDER 21
(1934).
22 BEALE, A HISTORY OF FREEDOM OF TEACHING IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS, 112-132,
175-195 (1941).24 Mass. Acts., c. 214 (1845).
25 "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal.26 Mass. Const. (1780).
27 5 Cush. (59 Mass.) 198 (1849). See Frank and Munro, The Original Understanding
of Equal Protection of the Laws, 50 Col. L. Rev. 131 (1950); Levy and Phillips, 56 Ameri-
can Historical Review, 510-518 (April, 1951).
The essence of the Abolitionists argument, as developed by Charles Sumner,
later to become a foremost advocate of equal rights in the United States Senate,
was that the Massachusetts constitutional provision that men are "born equal"
necessarily means they are equal in their rights before the law. Further, it is
beyond the power of the law to make distinctions among equal men.28 The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that since the school committee
had reached its decision reasonably and without obvious prejudice, there was no
necessary incompatibility between a system of separate schools and full "civil and
social" equality for Negroes. Mr. Chief Justice Shaw, while recognizing that
colored persons . .. are entitled by law ... to equal rights" stated:
• . . The committee, apparently with good deliberation, has come to the
conclusion, that the good of both classes of schools will be best promoted,
by maintaining the separate primary schools for colored and white children,
and we can perceive no ground to doubt that this is the honest result of
their experience and judgement.29  (Italics added.)
In regard to the effect of such distribution and classification, he further enunciated:
It is urged that this maintenance of separate schools tends to deepen and per-
petuate the odious distinction of caste, founded in a deep-rooted prejudice
in public opinion. This prejudice, if it exists, is not created by law, and
probably cannot be changed by law.30
The precedent of "separate but equal" was now firmly imbedded in law by the
decision of one of the North's most reputable courts. Moreover, it served as a
premise for its universal acceptance forty-seven years later, in the Plessy case.
The Massachusetts Court determined, in essence, that although Negroes were equal,
they were not deprived of equal rights when attending segregated public schools.
It was just this separateness which was struck down in the Brown case, when
Chief Justice Warren added emphasis to the decision by stating, "Separate educa-
tional facilities are inherently unequal."3' 1
The attitudes of the ante-bellum times are further reflected in the opinion of
Chief Justice Taney in the Dred Scott Decision.2  The Court held that a Negro
slave was not entitled to the rights of a white person even if he were free in the
state of his residence. Commenting upon the relationship of the Negro popula-
tion and the Declaration of Independence, he stated:
... They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an
inferior order; and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either
28 It is interesting to note the similarity between this argument and the later race
'classification" cases which arose under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Sweatt v. Painter,
Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, In the Supreme Court of the United
States, Oct. Term, 1949, at 6.
20 Note 27, supra at 209.
30Ibid. Segregation in Boston public schools ended in 1855. Mass Acts., c. 256
(1855).
31 Note 1, supra at 495. The effects of racial segregation were amply cited by the Court
and elsewhere. See Notes, 39 Col. L. Rev. 986, 1003 (1939); 56 Yale L.J. 1059, 1060
(1947); and 49 Col. L. Rev. 629, 634 (1949). In the overall consideration of racial
segregation and the public schools it should be borne in mind that ".... .education
comprehends the entire process of developing and training the mental, physical, and
moral powers and capabilities of human beings." Weyl v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 48 F. 2d 811, 812 (2d Cir. 1931); Jones v. Better Business Bureau, 123 F. 2d
767, 769 (10th Cir. 1941).
32Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
in social or political relations; and so far inferior that they had no rights
which the white man was bound to respect.
3 3
Federal Amendments and Legislative History
As stated by Guthrie, 4 equality for the Negro slaves was unfortunately not
intended. Despite the historical factor of rigid discrimination against Negroes,
the Civil War acted as a catalyst for those who advocated equal status for the
Negro by amelioration through acts of Congress. The Thirteenth Amendment
abolished slavery.3 5  The Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed citizenship, due
process and equal protection of the laws." The Fifteenth Amendment guaranteed
the right of citizens to vote.3 7  Additional acts by Congress in the form of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866,38 the Freedman's Bureau Extension Act,39 and the Civil
Rights Act of 187540 gave the Negroes additional political status.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren pointed out in the Brown case that the legislative
history of the Fourteenth Amendment is "inconclusive" as to whether the framers.
of the Amendment intended to abolish or to maintain racial segregation in the
public schools. It was not stated by the Amendment that segregation would be
permitted; nor was it stated that equality in education for Negroes would be
required.4' The Fourteenth Amendment grew out of proposals considered by
the Joint Committee on Reconstruction of the 39th Congress. 3 In addition, not
only did the final adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment fail to indicate applica-
bility to education,4 3 but neither was there any major reference to schools in the
majority or minority reports of the Joint Committee."4 It is conceded, however,
that consideration was given to education on the respective floors of the Senate
and the House of Representatives.
48
33 Id. at 419.
3 4
GUTHRIE, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 106 (1898).
85 U. S. CONST. XIII, § 1: Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
30 U. S. CONST. XIV, § 1: All persons born or naturalized in the United States ...
are citizens thereof . . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
37 U. S. CONST. XV, § 1: The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.
38 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
39 14 Stat. 173 (1866).
40 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
41 Brown v. Board of Education. Supplemental Brief for the United States on
Reargument, Amici Curiae, by the United States Attorney General, for the October
Term, p. 99, 1953.
42Journal of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, S. Doc. 711, 39th Cong. 3rd
Sess. (1865). But see, Frank and Munro, note 27, supra.
4s KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON REcON-
STRUCTION, 37-129 (1914).
44H.R. Rep., 39th Cong., 1st Sess., VI-XXI, 1-13. (1865).
4' See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2433-3149 (1865).
In statutory interpretation, and more particularly in the interpretation of
Amendments, the Supreme Court has consistently reflected a candid attitude.
This approach of the Court was emphatically summarized in Maxwell v. Dow,"'
which involved a claim that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to make
applicable to the states, the jury requirements of the Sixth Amendment:
. . . It is clear that what is said in Congress upon such an occasion
may or may not express the views of the majority of those who favor adoption
of the measure which may be before that body, and the question whether the
proposed amendment itself expresses the meaning which those who spoke in
its favor may have assumed that it did, is one to be determined by the
language actually therein used and not by the speeches made regarding it.
4 T
The Court will review the background and environment of the times in order to
illuminate the broad purposes which an Amendment was designed to achieve."s
But a proper balance must be developed. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in
Adamson v. California,4 stated:
. . . Remarks of a particular proponent of the (Fourteenth) Amendment,
no matter how influential, are not to be deemed part of this amendment.
What was submitted for ratification was his proposal, not his speech.
Judicial Development
The Fourteenth Amendment entered the litigation arena when the Supreme
Court of Ohio was challenged to determine the constitutionality of segregated
schools on the basis of both the State and Federal Constitutions in State ex rel.
Games v. McCann.50 Although the court gave due consideration to the privileges
and immunities clause and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, it upheld segregation on the basis of equal school facilities. The court did
not cite the Roberts case as authority, but, on its own merits, became the basis for
future courts to dispose of the question of segregated schools.61
In 1875 the Civil Rights Act was enacted by Congress. 2 Eight years later,
The Civil Rights Cases3 came before the Supreme Court, which held that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit racial segregation upon private intrastate
carriers, since the Fourteenth Amendment was applicable only to state action and
46 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 (1900). See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169
U. S. 649, 699 (1898).
47 Id. at 601.
48 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1946); McPherson v. Blacker, 146
U.S. 1, 27 (1892).
49332 U.S. 46, 64 (1947).
5021 Ohio St. 198 (1872).
51 Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 (1874). Litigation arose concerning the segregated
schools, but in each case the opposition was beaten back on the basis of the Roberts or the
McCann decisions. Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36 (1874). In 1880 California abolished its
segregated schools, but precluded Chinese or Mongolian children from a "white school".
Tape v. Hurley, 66 Cal. 473, 6 P. 129 (1885). In People ex -el. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y.
438 (1883), the court utilized the Roberts case as great weight for upholding segregation
in New York schools. For a comprehensive discussion of the subject see, Ransmeir, The
Separate But Equal Doctrine, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 203 (1951).
12 18 Star. 335 (1875).
53 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
the carriers acted as private parties. The Court declared: "Positive rights and
privileges are undoubtedly secured by the Fourteenth Amendment; but they are
secured by way of prohibition against state laws and state proceedings .... "15
The Amendment does not extend to "... . wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported
by State authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceed-
ings.' 's s The Court expressly reserved decision as to the power of Congress to
prohibit segregation in interstate transportation.56
It was with this background that Plessy v. Ferguson,5 7 came to the Supreme
Court. The question presented to the Court was the validity of a Louisiana statute
providing for "separate but equal" accommodations for the white and colored
races on railway trains. The relevancy of this case to education, and perhaps the
reason for the application of the doctrine, is the utilization by Mr. Justice Brown
of the Roberts case to substantiate his position of legal segregation.
The most common instance of this is connected with the establishment of
separate schools for white and colored children, which has been held to be
a valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of States where the
political rights of the colored race have been longest and most earnestly
enforced. One of the earliest of these cases is that of Roberts v. City of
Boston.5 s  (Italics added.)
After the Plessy case, the constitutional doctrine of "separate but equal"
became firmly established as an integral part of our national and state law. Sub-
sequently, in Cumming v. Board of Education,5" while the doctrine itself was not
attacked, the Court held that Negro taxpayers could not enjoin the Georgia Rich-
mond County School Board from collecting and disbursing tax funds for a high
school for white children before it resumed a high school for Negroes. The Court
stated that there was no denial of equal protection as long as facilities were pro-
vided for colored children in nearby private schools.
Despite the bed-rock firmness of the "separate but equal" doctrine, the Court
has been extremely discreet in its consideration of issues in which race or color
were determinants. In the Slaughter House Cases, 0 Mr. Justice Miller stated
that the due process and equal protection clauses would be used primarily to
prevent racial oppression and discrimination; but he made no reference to edu-
cation.
A San Francisco city ordinance was struck down which allowed arbitrary
differentiation between whites and Chinese.6 Similarly, in more recent cases the
54Id. at 11.
55 Id. at 17.
56 Id. at 19.
57 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See Ransmeir, note 51, supra.
5s Id. at 544.
59 175 U.S. 528 (1899).(0 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); cf. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880),
where the Court declared invalid a state statute restricting jury service to vhite persons
on the basis of a denial of equal protection to a colored defendant; Virginia v. Rives, 100
U.S. 313 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
61 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
policy of the Court was emphasized. In Hirabayashi v. United States, 2 Mr. Chief
Justice Stone, in a majority opinion, characterized racial distinctions as "odious to
a free people." In Korematzu v. United States,"s the Court considered racial re-
strictions as "immediately suspect." Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in Edwards v.
California,4 referred to race and color as "constitutionally an irrelevance." Mr.
Justice Douglas, dissenting in South v. Peters,.5 viewed discrimination based upon
race, color, or creed "beyond the pale." Mr. Justice Burton in Henderson v. United
States,6 described signs, partitions and curtains segregating Negroes in railroad
dining cars as emphasizing the "artificiality of a difference in treatment which
serves only to call attention to a racial classification of passengers holding identical
tickets and using the same public dining facility." In all but the Japanese National
cases, rigid discriminatory statutes have been struck down.
Where state action was involved, sweeping decisions have secured the right
of Negroes to make effective use of the electoral process consistent with the re-
quirements of the Fifteenth Amendment. 7 State restrictions on the right of a
Negro to vote have been held contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.8 The
Court has not sanctioned systematic exclusion of Negroes from petit or grand
juries;"0 nor their representation on juries on a token or proportional basis; 70 nor
in any method in the selection of juries found susceptible of racial discrimination.71
Legislation depriving persons of particular races of an opportunity to pursue a
gainful occupation has been held a denial of equal protection.7 2  In addition, a
state may not make racial distinctions among its employees the basis for salary
differentiations. 71 State laws requiring racial segregation in interstate commerce
have been declared invalid invasions of the congressional commerce power.
74
Where a state sought to enforce its local non-segregation policy against a foreign
62320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). See Tussman and tenBroek, Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341 (1949).
63 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). See Presumptions of Constitutionality, 2 Catholic U. L.
Rev. 101 (1952).
04314 U.S. 180, 185 (1941).
6 339 U.S. 276, 278 (1950).
60 339 U.S. 816, 824 (1950). Segregation in a dining car operated by an interstate
railroad was held to violate a federal statute. 54 Stat. 902, 49 U.S.C. § 3(1).
67 Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), "grandfather" clause was held un-
constitutional; Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 649 (1939); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 1003 (1953).
00 Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
69Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942).
70 Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951).
71 Avery v. United States, 345 U.S. 559 (1953); Hernandez v. United States, 347 U.S.
475 (1954). See Class Discrimination in Selection of Jurors, 5 Catholic U. L. Rev. 157
(1955).
72 Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commissioner,
334 U.S. 410 (1948). In the Takahashi case a California statute which prohibited a resident
Japanese alien from earning his living as a fisherman was declared unconstitutional.
7 Alston v. School Board, 112 F. 2d 992 (4th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 693
(1940).
74 Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946). The state statute was held to be an un-
lawful restraint on interstate commerce. See Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878).
commerce carrier, the state law was upheld.75 In relation to realty, the Court
held it a denial of due process for an ordinance to prohibit Negroes from moving
into predominately white areas and whites into Negro areas.
7 6
State Enforced School Segregation
The major cases concerning statutory public school segregation began in 1927.
In Gong Lum v. Rice77 the question was whether a Chinese girl was deprived of
equal protection of the laws when she was classified with Negroes. Mr. Chief
Justice Taft stated she was not so injured under the Constitution of Mississippi,
which provides: "Separate schools shall be maintained for children of the white
and colored races.
' '7 8
In matters relating to graduate schools for colored persons, the Court held in
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada7" that the state itself must provide at least
separate but equal legal education within its borders. Mr. Justice Hughes declared:
• ..petitioner's right was a personal one. It was as an individual that he
was entitled to the equal protection of the laws, and the State was bound to
furnish him within its borders for legal education substantially equal
to those afforded for persons of the white race, whether or not other Negroes
sought the same opportunity.8 0
The cause of proper graduate school education was further advanced in Sipuel
v. Oklahoma."' The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandate that a profes-
sional education must be made available by the state for Negro applicants
as soon as it is for white applicants to a state graduate school. In meeting this
challenge, the Oklahoma Court gave the Board of Regents three alternatives:
First, they could admit Miss Sipuel to the first year law class at the University when
it commenced the next semester; second, they could exclude her and all other
applicants, both white and colored; or third, they could set up equal facilities for
her to be ready when school began again. 2 In a subsequent suit in the Supreme
Court, Miss Sipuel having become Mrs. Fisher, sought to compel the Regents to
admit her on the basis that equal facilities could not be set up overnight and that
compliance with the original Supreme Court mandate could only be effected by
her admission to the University immediately.8" The Supreme Court held that the
Oklahoma Court alternatives satisfied the original order and the demands of
equality under the Fourteenth Amendment.
7 Bo-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948). The Michigan statute
forbidding discrimination was held valid as applied to an excursion boat operating on the
Detroit River.
76 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
7 275 U.S. 78 (1927). The fundamental question pertained to classification.
78Miss. Const. § 270 (1890).
70 305 U.S. 337 (1938). Missouri was sending its Negro students out of state for their
legal education and paid the tuition expenses therefor. For an early discussion concerning
abolition of white graduate schools rather than permit integration, see Note, 17 N.C. L
Rev. 280 (1939). Cf. University of Maryland v. Murray, 169 Md. 478 (1935).
0Id. at 351.
81332 U.S. 631 (1948).
82 199 Okla. 36, 180 P. 2 135 (1948).
8 Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U.S. 147 (1948). Mr. Justice Rutledge dissented and agreed
with the petitioner.
Another facet of infringements corelative to the fundamental guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment was brought to the fore in Shelley v. Kraemer.'4
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson declared that private racial restrictive covenants were not
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment but could not be enforced by state courts
even though "equality of application" pertained to both whites and Negroes. As
stated by the Chief Justice, "Equal protection of the laws is not achieved through
the indiscriminate imposition of inequalities." '
In Sweatt v. Painter,8 Sweatt was denied admission to the University of
Texas Law School solely on the basis of his race in accordance with Texas statutes.
8 7
At the time Sweatt applied, there was no Negro law school in the state. The State
subsequently did provide a Negro law school. The Supreme Court held it a denial
of equal protection of the laws to exclude a qualified student from the University
of Texas Law School solely on a racial basis. Certain obvious inequalities of the
two schools were mentioned which would provide the "intangible" assets gained
from attending the Texas Law School. In relation to contemporary education, the
Chief Justice enunciated:
... The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and practice,
cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with
which the law interacts. Few students and no one who has practiced law
would choose to studyjin an academic vacuum, removed from the interplay
of ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is concerned.
88
The Court demanded the admission of Sweatt to the University of Texas Law
School in view of overall inequalities between the schools.
McLaurin v. Oklahoma Board of Regents"" was decided on the same day as
84334 U.S. 1 (1948). Cf. Hurd v. Hodges, 334 U.S. 24 (1948), where the Court
held that a restrictive covenant was unenforceable in the Federal Court of the District
of Columbia for reasons of public policy. Barrows v. Jackson, 345 U.S. 632 (1953).
85 Id. at 22.
86339 U.S. 629 (1950).
87 Tex. Const., Art. VII, § 714; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon 1925), Arts. 2463b
(Supp. 1949), 2719, 2900.
88 Id. at 634. At the time of this case, there was no law school in Texas which
admitted Negroes. The State Court recognized the statutes deprived the petitioner of equal
protection of laws of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nevertheless, the court did not grant
the relief asked, but allowed the State six months to provide equal facilities. At the end
of the six months period in December, 1946, the State Court again denied Sweatt's writ when
it was shown that authorized university officials had adopted an order calling for the opening
of a Negro law school the following February. Subsequently, Sweatt refused to register.
Additional court proceedings indicated that the petitioner had substantial equal facilities
for the study of law. The trial court denied mandamus and the Court of Civil Appeals
affirmed. 210 S.W. 2d 442 (1948). Sweatt's writ of error to the Texas Supreme Court was
denied, but the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the constitutional issues.
The Court considered the principles of "indiscriminate imposition of inequalities" of
Shelley v. Kraemer, note 84, supra at 22: the timing of equal facilities mentioned in the
Sipuelcase, note 81, supra at 633: and the "personal and present" constitutional right set
down in the Gaines case, note 79, supra at 351. The "intangibles" were reputation of
faculty, experience of administration, position and influence of alumni, tradition and
prestige.
89 339 U.S. 637 (1950). In McKissick v. Carmichael, 187 F. 2d 949, 952 (4th Cir.
1951), Judge Soper ruled that Negroes must be admitted to the white University of North
Carolina Law School in terms flatly rejecting the thesis of the separate but equal
facilities. He stated: "It is a definite handicap to the colored student to confine his association
in the Law School with people of his own class".
the Sweatt case. The petitioner was a Negro who had been admitted to the Uni-
versity of Oklahoma as a candidate for a doctorate degree in education. After
admission he was systematically set apart from the other students. The issue was
whether a state may, after admitting a student for graduate instruction in its state
university, afford him different treatment from other students solely because of
his race. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, again speaking for a unanimous Court, stated:
The result is that appellant is handicapped in his pursuit of effective graduate
instruction. Such restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage
in discussions and exchange views with other students, and in general, to
learn his profession. There is a vast difference-a Constitutional difference-
between restrictions imposed by the state which prohibit the intellectual
commingling of students, and the refusal of individuals to commingle where
the state presents no such bar.o
The Court held that, under the circumstances in this case, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Equal Protection Clause precludes differences in treatment by the state upon
race distinctions and each student must receive the same treatment from the state.
The Court did not consider the unconstitutionality per se of statutory segregation
but adhered to the principle of deciding constitutional questions only in the con-
text of the particular pending cases. In both the Sweatt and McLaurin cases the
Court refused to re-examine the Plessy decision. Nevertheless, it is submitted
that the "death-knell" of the "separate but equal" doctrine was being sounded in
that these cases served as prologue to the climax in case history.
Thus, the Brown case, and its counterparts, was one of first instance in pre-
senting to the Supreme Court the question of the constitutionality of state statutory
segregation per se in public school education under the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is submitted that the preceding presentation of case law indicates the inevita-
bility of the overthrow which the "separate but equal" doctrine faced when the
constitutionality per se of the doctrine was finally before the Supreme Court.
Quo Vadis?
In the Brown case, the Court has asked for the full assistance of all interested
parties in the formulation of the administrative decrees directed toward the effec-
tuation of integration in the public schools.9 Questions Four and Five on
Reargument were propounded to ask this aid. These Questions relate to the
O 0d. at 641. See, The Beginning of the End of the Separate But Equal Doctrine,
I Catholic L. Rev. 70 (1950); Green, The Fourteenth Amendment and Racial Segregation
in State Supported Schools, 24 Temple L.Q. 222 (1950); Waite, The Negro in the
Supreme Court: Five Years More, 35 Minn. L. Rev. 625 (1951); Segregation in Schools
of Higher Learning, 3 S.C.L.Q. 71 (1950).
91During the week of April 15, 1955, the ideas of litigants, interested states and
those of the Federal Government were presented to the Court.
02 "4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the Fourteenth
Amendment
(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the limits set by normal
geographical school districting, Negro children should forthwith be admitted to schools of
their choice, or
(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an effective graduate
adjustment to be brought about from existing segregated systems to a system not based
on color distinctions?
Court's power to grant relief and the manner in which such relief should be
administered. The basic underlying problem in the instant situation is to deter-
mine the most just and expeditious manner of ending the segregated school sys-
tems. "The essential consideration is that the remedy be as effective and fair as
possible in preventing continued or future violations of the [law] in the light of




Congress has explicitly granted the Court the power to enter "such appropriate
judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may
be just under the circumstances. ' 4  The scope and judicial flexibility of this
power has been demonstrated many times." Concerning the adaptability of equity
jurisdiction, the Court said in Hecht Co. v. Bowles:9
• . . Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of
mercy and practicality have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment
and reconciliation between the public interest and private needs as well as
between competing private claims.
Where public interests are involved, as in the Brown case, equitable powers "as-
sume an even broader and more flexible character than when only a private
controversy is at stake."97  Equity "may mold its decree so as to accomplish prac-
tical results-such results as law and justice demand.""8
In civil cases the Court has frequently suspended the operation of decrees on
the basis of inconvenience to the public or undue hardship to the wrongdoer and
has allowed sufficient time for removing the illegality. The Supreme Court
determined in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co."' that injunctive relief should be
granted, ". . . after allowing a reasonable time to the defendants to complete the
structures that they are now building, and the effort that they are making to stop
the fumes." Even though the decision in this case was rendered in 1907, the
matter was still before the Court in 1916. In the abatement of nuisances, the
"5. On the assumption on which questions 4(a) and (b) are based, and assuming
further that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the end described in question 4(b),
(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases;
(b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach;
(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence with a view to recom-
mending specific terms for such decrees;
(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with directions to frame
decrees in these cases, and if so what general directions should the decrees of this Court
include and what procedures should the courts of first instance follow in arriving at the
specific terms of more detailed decrees?" Note 1, supra at 495-496.
93 United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 335 (1947).
94 28 U.S.C. 2106.
95 Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426 (1948); Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Chicago
&c Ry. Co., 163 U.S. 564 (1896); see STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 28, 578 (14th
ed.); POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 111, 170, 175a (5th ed.).
90321 U.S. 321, 329 (1943). See Addison v. Holly Hill Co., 322 U.S. 607, 622
(1944), where the Court commented, "In short, the judicial process is not without the
resources of flexibility in shaping its remedies, though courts from time to time fail to
avail themselves of them".
97 Porter v. Warner Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent
Co., 320 U.S. 661, 670 (1944); Inland Steel Co. v. U. S., 153, 157 (1939).
98 Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 360 (1907).
99206 U.S. 230, 239 (1906).
effective date of injustices has often been suspended, in state courts, to allow
necessary readjustment time.100
Due to the entanglements of industrial arrangements in the area of monopolies
and illegal business combinations, the federal courts have granted lengthy periods
of time for re-adjustment commensurate with the decisions. 1' In antitrust suits
where violations of questionable legality have persisted over great periods of time
with national economic intricacies, overnight elimination of the illegal practices
would be catastrophic. In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, °2 the Court directed
an extension of time for executing the decree from a period of thirty days to at
least six months, "in view of the magnitude of the interests involved and their
complexity."'' 0  Where a substantial injury would result by cutting off the flow
of vital commodities, the Court considered the best method of accomplishing the
declared result with "as little injury as possible to the interests of the general
public."'1 4 Extensions of time have been summarily granted by the Supreme Court
after a determination of the basic rights indicated by such requirement. 05 The
reorganization of the Seaboard Air Line Railway was in process almost sixteen
years before it was completed. 0'
The Supreme Court, in New Jersey v. New York,'07 held that New Jersey
was entitled to relief from the dumping of New York City garbage into the ocean
off the New Jersey coast. The Court allowed New York City approximately
eighteen months to conform. In a subsequent action, the Court postponed the
finality of the court's decision until a period of four years from the entry of the
first order against New York City.
If such periods of time are allotted to businesses and states, it would appear
that such "reasonable" time limits should also be prudently imposed upon the
states relative to integration. The prior position of men supersedes that of busi-
ness or state. The factor of harmonious "co-existence" of the races is a constant
problem that cannot go undirected. It is constitutionally recognized that the equal
protection of the laws confers a personal and present right. Nevertheless, the
Court also recognizes the considerations of public interest, public peace and do-
mestic tranquility directed toward the common good. It is submitted that the
Supreme Court has the requisite powers to lay down matters of policy affecting
public education throughout the United States by its equity jurisdiction.
100 Harding v. Stamford Water Co., 41 Conn. 87, Caretti v. Broring Building Co.,
150 Md. 198, 132 A. 619 (1926); See 46 A.L.R. 1, 35-37 for reasonable time in
abatement of nuisances.
101 Cf. Note 98, supra.
102221 U.S. 1 (1911).
108 Id at 81.
'Lo United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
105 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948), a period of four
years was granted; United States v. National Lead Co., note 93, supra.
106 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Railway, 68 F. Supp. 304 (E.D. Va. 1946).
107283 U.S. 473 (1931).
As stated above, the statutes of seventeen states requiring segregated public
schools were declared unconstitutional by the Brown decision.108 Four states with
permissive segregation statutes were also affected. The administrative and legis-
lative problem from most of the states concerned are presumed to be immense.
The decrees from the Supreme Court will determine the legislation, active and
passive to the decision, which will be enacted by the states. At least one state
legislature will not be in session during 1955, but hearings have been held relative
to the integration problems. 0' Considerations must be given to the geographical
variations, in approach and timing among different localities, to intensity of com-
munity racial feelings, to diverse academic backgrounds between Negro and white
students, to health measures, to the psychological needs of the children being
integrated, and to the financial and administrative problems. 1 0 Probably the most
important factor in integration of the public schools is public opinion in the
particular community.
1 1
Not only is community attitude of prime importance, but also the general
attitude of the whole state. Indicative of the intensity with which some states view
the Brown decision, is the recent action taken by the Mississippi Legislature. It
passed "Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of State of Mississippi.' 112
As the Attorney General for Mississippi has said:"1s
... I say again that the public school system with separate education for the
races can and will be maintained in Mississippi . . . In my considered opinion
this statute will, along with other pertinent factors, furnish a legally unassail-
able answer to this problem for many, many years to come . . .We did not
ask for this school crisis. It has been forced upon us. We will not shrink
from the challenge. Our public school system and separate education for the
races will be preserved. (Italics added.)
In addition to the proposal of the State of Mississippi, alternative plans have been
made by a number of states, but none have been enacted into statutes."1
4
Bogus private school systems are as obvious an evasion of the Constitution
10s Note 18, supra.
109 Virginia.
110 Paul, The School Segregation Decision, Law and Government, Institute of Govern-
ment, University of North Carolina, pp. 63-85 (1954).
111 ASHMORE, THE NEGRO AND THE SCHOOLS, 81-2 (Chapel Hill 1954).
112 Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Mississippi, House
Concurrent Resolution No. 2:
"A Concurrent Resolution submitted an Amendment to Article 8 ...authorizing the
Legislature by two-thirds vote of those present and voting in each house to abolish public
schools and authorize the counties and school districts to abolish public schools, sell and
dispose of school buildings, lands and other property, and make appropriation of public
funds, and do other such acts and things deemed necessary to aid and assist educable children
of this state to secure an education. . ....
The bill authorizing the legislature to abolish the public school system was voted on
and approved in referendum December 21, 1954.
113An address by Attorney General Coleman of Mississippi, delivered over the
facilities of TV Station WLBT, Jackson, Mississippi, June 1, 1954. Letter received from
Attorney General Coleman, November 26, 1954.
114 Alabama Legislature Reference Service, The School Segregation Problem, Jan. 1954.
as were the white primaries of a few years ago." 5 Nevertheless, of the proposed
plans put forth, one provides for the state to create a system of state-supported
free private schools. There is another in which the state simply pays each
family with school-age children, a grant of money to secure their education in
any private school which is available.1 ' It need not be overemphasized that the
constitutionality of such activities might be attacked with the "public purpose"
and "state action" cases.1
1 7
In consideration of some of the actual and some of the probable facts enumer-
ated above, it is submitted that the transition from segregation can best be
effectuated by the courts of first instance."l8 The Supreme Court has precedent
for such action. 19 It has, in many instances, remanded cases to the lower courts
for proceedings in accordance with its mandate.1 20  The ultimate disposition of the
myriad problems involved in the Brown case requires additional facts. The Court
commented in International Salt Company v. United States:" 1
The framing of decrees should take place in the District rather than in
Appellate Courts. They are invested with large discretion to model their
judgements to fit the exigencies of the particular case.
As stated by the Attorney General of the United States relative to the complexity
of the problem:
There is no single formula or blueprint which can be uniformly applied in
all areas where existing school segregation must be ended. Local conditions
vary . . . Only a pragmatic approach based on a knowledge of local
conditions and problems can determine what is best in a particular place.
For this reason, the court of first instance in such area should be charged
with the responsibility for supervision of a program for carrying out the
Court's decision. This Court should not, either itself or through the appoint-
ment of a special master, undertake to formulate specific and detailed
programs of implementation adapted to the special needs of particular cases.' 22
Conclusion
It would appear that the Supreme Court of the United States has met a most
difficult national problem forthrightly. It has extended the privileges of the Court
"5 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1924); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932),
pertained to unconstitutional party rule prohibiting Negroes from voting in the primary
elections; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953),
Texas Jaybird elections.
116Paul, note 110, supra 33 to 63. The prepared work by Mr. Paul is recommended
as an excellent critique of the present Southern dilemma.
117 See e.g., Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall 655 (1874); Green v. Frazier, 253
U.S. 233 (1920). Cf. Paul, note 110, supra at 54. Cf. Cochran v. Louisiana State Board,
281 U.S. 370 (1936).
118 Brown v. Board of Education, supra. Brief for the Petitioners on the Mandate,
24, in Gebhart v. Belton. H. Albert Young, Attorney General of the State of Delaware.
"19 Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580 (1929); Sipuel v. Board of
Regents, supra; Sweatt v. Painter, supra.
120 Russellv. Southard, 12 How. (U.S.) 139; Ballard v. Searls, 130 U.S. 50 (1888).
21332 U.S. 392, 400 (1947).
122 Brown v. Board of Education, supra, Amici Curiae Supplemental Brief on Re-
argument by the Attorney General of the United States, Oct. Term. 1953. In the Supreme
Court of the United States, pp. 184-185.
to children and to their respective states. The decision was rendered in favor of
the children. In view of the gravity of the situation, the Court granted additional
time for suggestions from interested parties relative to the formulation of the
administrative decrees. Thus, the maximum of "due process" has been rendered
to all concerned.
It is submitted that perhaps, at last, the Fourteenth Amendment has come to
its true fruition in the recognition of the fundamental rights of our citizens with-
out distinction. The evolution of law leading to the overthrow of the "separate
but equal" doctrine in education should not now become a social revolution in the
integration of our public schools. Rather, the "reasonable time" standard must be
adopted and applied in the discretion of the Court. Revolutionary advocacy of im-
mediate and universal integration would create consternation in the body politic.
It is in such times as these that traditional American principles must synthesize
with their Judaic-Christian counterparts in the virtues of charity, justice, mercy, and
prudence. It is the application of these principles to our constitutionally guaran-
teed rights which will provide the solution to our national racial ill-feeling. Both
Charles Sumner and Justice Harlan, in the dissent in the Plessy case, are vindicated.
The law is now "color-blind." The fictional "doctrine" of "separate but equal" has
been stripped of its juridical recognition. The Supreme Court has subsequently
granted certiorari, vacated judgements and remanded cases to the lower courts for
consideration in the light of the Segregation Cases.12 8 Certiorari has been denied
in situations concerning public recreational facilities,124 public housing' 25 and
public education.1
2
It is submitted that the decision in the Brown case firmly elevates the dignity
of the individual and the prestige and quality of our law based on social justice.
This decision will be remembered in history as epitomizing those memorable
words of Chief Justice Marshall, "We must never forget it is a Constitution we
are expounding."
GEORGE J. BERTAIN, JR.
122Where petitioners were denied admission to law schools because they were
Negroes. Florida ex rel Hawkins et al. v. Board of Control of Florida et al., 60 So.2d
162 (Fla. S.Ct. 1952); Turead v. Louisiana State University, 207 F. 2d 807 (5th Cit.
1953). Negroes were deprived of admission to a municipally owned amphitheater leased
to private parties who discriminated against Negroes. Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical
Association, 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cit. 1953). Cert. granted, 347 U.S. 971 (1954).
124Golfing facilities were not municipally provided for Negroes as for white
persons. Beal v. Holcombe, 193 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1951). Cert. denied, 347 U.S.
974 (1954). The State of Maryland has appealed to the United States Supreme Court
to reverse the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit which held the
Segregation Cases applicable to three public recreational facilities cases. Lonesome et al.
v. Maxwell et al., 123 F.Supp. 193 (D.Md. 1954). 23 L.W. 1145 (March 29, 1955).
125 A municipal housing authority requirement in California admitting Negroes on
an equal basis in permanent public low-rent housing developments was sustained.
Housing Authority v. Banks, 120 Cal. App.2d 1, 260 P.2d 688 (1953). Cert. denied,
347 U.S. 974 (1954).
126 Sustained admission of Negro students to public junior college. Wichita Falls
Junior College District et al. v. Battle et al. 204 F.2d 632 (5th Cit. 1953). Cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954).
